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When talking about the justice deficit of the European project, immediately two
issues come to the fore. There is the creeping expansion of economic governance
happening at the expense of democratic politics, which is allowed and facilitated
by the now dominant interpretation of our political values. And then there are
the institutional arrangements, providing legitimacy to a series of decisions at
the EU level we call “austerity measures”. The economic rationality of austerity,
which is dictating how we do Europe now, has been made possible by a particular
understanding of the European project which perceives Europe as a venture of
(economic) governance.
While institutions keep working, with reference to the same rules and procedures, an
increasing number of fundamental political decisions is made literary “behind closed
doors” of expert bodies, mainly justified as economic inherent necessities. The shift
of power from political representatives to independent experts and to the judiciary,
as seen in the strengthened position of the ECJ for economic issues represents a
substantial change in the political landscape of Europe. Suddenly, the idea of Europe
and the praxis of European integration is most visibly represented by the austerity
paradigm of Angela Merkel.
This discourse of austerity ceases to be dispositional and becomes legitimized
and entrenched with reference to (legal) principles, which are the foundations of
the European project in the first place. This runs parallel to the tendency to treat
austerity as quasi-teleological, and as self-evidently a good thing. The reference to
seemingly universal and principled vocabulary found in pre-existing authoritative
statements (treaties, conventions and ECJ decisions) allows us to conclude that
austerity has been properly justified. Events in Europe are subsequently subsumed
under the remit of the austerity paradigm and not vice versa and the consequences
prescribed by austerity principles then simply follow. In other words, principles which
were supposedly designed to re-act, suddenly perform primarily pre-scriptive and
classificatory functions. They do Europe for us.
Public statements like “there is no alternative” tell us much more about the relation
to reality than about this reality itself, since they rather express our reflective sense
than analyse the current state of affairs. They gradually become more fundamental,
encompassing social structures and effectively begin to define the terms of the
debate; they legitimate certain frames over others and create ‘the givens’ of Europe
while simultaneously defining away alternative solutions, forms and imaginaries
as unthinkable. Such interpretative monopoly is built on the ability to construct the
problem in a certain way, to define the issues at hand in a certain way and as a
result define the solutions as well.
The idea of ‘Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism’ developed by Kumm (or ‘European
Constitutionalism beyond the State’) is a very pertinent example of a vision which
- 1 -
isolates government from democratic politics – it (seemingly) embraces pluralism
and entrenches itself in a thick set of substantive and procedural norms. It presents
itself as a mere ‘cognitive’ structuring frame in which legal and political practice
unfolds. This over-arching frame is anchored in universal moral ideals embedded
in respective European field of shared values (i.e. human dignity, the rule of law
and respect for human rights) which are in their turn embedded in the EU’s legal
order and by their very nature not dispositive but immanent in the concept of EU law
itself. That which Kumm presents as a mere ‘structuring device’ nonetheless ensures
the optimisation of the uniform application of EU law by providing a framework for
‘mutual deliberative engagement’. Even though it presents itself as a mere frame of
reference, it fiercely subsumes everything under its frame of reference and directs
the field for decision making – it tries to colonize the entire discursive field of the
European project.
This entire apparatus therefore builds towards a decision that had, to a large
extent, been determined even before the case was made subject to it, and the
same time avoids the need to offer deeper substantive justification – paradoxically,
justification by way of substantive values is at the end more superficial. This
‘structuring device’, by way of reducing national legal orders and competing
claims for legitimate European project to components in a larger frame of ‘mutual
deliberative engagement’ on shared values, transforms European constitutions into
“soft law” and allows for a new paradigm to be introduced, one which is, under the
‘cognitive’ structuring frame is governed by huge increase of arbitrariness and self-
referential logics. What has consequently emerged is a new assemblage of power
capable of dictating standards and norms that increasingly restrict the field of action
of any politics, a web of soft law and standards of governance, best practices, and
administrative procedures.
And when the market begins to function as a focal point of our deliberations it
immediately begins to produce specifically demarcated sets of authoritative values,
concerns and interests; other forms of judgment are displaced as possible modes of
evaluative discernment – the epistemological mechanisms of the economy become
the practice of judgment as it brings out a utilitarian rationality to bear on all practices
of government and thereby transforming the very meaning of “nature” to refer to the
specific logic at work in governmental practices. This is how “the financial stability
of the euro area as a whole” becomes the only acceptable mode of decision making
that channel and articulate the needs of financial capital making its command
immediately effective.
This crucial transformation of our democratic landscape replaces the social contract
with the market. Once the market principles manage to capture the tools with which
we decided to build our European project, namely the law and European constitution,
we begin to imagine Europe according to the social rationality of neoliberalism.
Codification of something akin to a ´cognitive frame of reference´ thus amounts
to an “objectification” or “crystallization” of divisions that could otherwise only be
generated spontaneously, since it implies a principle which can be applied to
particular cases, without a remainder. In this manner, the decision making process
is transposed onto a body of neutral, widely shared principles enforced by a neutral,
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beyond the state, body. Our laws and our lives are interpreted, applied, and typically
produced by a body of trained experts, and these processes are restricted to an
institutional arena which establishes the very terrain of any public deliberation,
the scope and limits of what might be undertaken politically or/and symbolically.
Recall that Kumm characterizes the development of constitutional law in the EU as
an experimentalist process in which, against the backdrop of polyarchic decision-
making, the ECJ establishes framework rules; national courts conditionally apply
them in differing ways, however differences are gradually contained and resolved in
iterated exchanges between the ECJ and national legal systems.
The idea of Constitutionalism beyond the state perfectly matches the essentially
non-political, economic arrangement that has clothed itself in political discourses of
human rights, rule of law and democracy. The forms and procedures put forward
by Kumm et.al. conceal the initial lack of substance and proximity with the life of
Europeans and their daily dealings and the relations which the framework they
were designed to merely formalize. The Union postulates the a-priori conditions
of unity which do not dynamically (organically) emerge from within the heat of
political life – unity appears as extraneous layers superimposed on the disarray of
European communities. What remains, within the framework the European Union,
is an expression without anything to express, devoid if not of meaning then of
a connection to the sources of meaningfulness. The relegation of constitutional
substance to the background and its substitution with constitutional details played
out in a very formalistic register is able to substantiate the highly formal institutional
arrangement where unity does not actually exist and which is not in any way bound
to the texture of political existence.
In the new global constitutional order, this economic theology has replaced the
political one. We found a new “nomos”, the nomos of austerity. The austerity
paradigm became the modern version of the fight against the katechon in the
medieval Christian Roman Empire, and the ultimate political justification. This
perhaps explains the radical change in the European constitutional and symbolic
landscape, where the rise of the new “holy alliances” against the crisis of the
common currency has to be fought because “there is no alternative”. Consequently,
this framework regulates our very ontological freedom. The common political identity
of Europeans is assumed with the help of the very same structures designed for the
de-politicization of public affairs.
The “beyond the nation state milieu” as envisaged by Kumm also creates a
space for huge flexibility of “governance” and for the development of multi-level
regulations which would have been impossible at the nation state level. These
“beyond-the-state” arrangements imply a common framework of shared values,
founded upon an institutional configuration dominated by a particular rationality.
This post-political frame, the technocratic dream of pure post-politics, reduces the
project of Europe within the “givens” set out by the principles which serve austerity
paradigm. The power of post-political democracy resides, in other words, in the
declaration of its impotence to act politically which is ultimately reflected in the
institutional configurations. Although the formal configuration of democracy is still
intact, there is a proliferating arsenal of new processes that bypass, evacuate
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or articulate with these formal institutions. The European project is slowly being
transformed into a meaning given by investment banking, determined by the practice
of conducting “expertise” entirely disjoined from democratic decision-making.
The crisis management becomes the real unifying thread of the constitutional
development of the EU.
The idea of Europe is in crisis. So are European countries, and European Union
scholarship is no exception. Our scholarly conceptualisations of the EU – as a
community of law, as a democracy, as a post-national sui generis polity – are also in
need of a radical rethink. We must decisively refuse the false choices offered to us,
and instead redefine it altogether. In so doing, we will redefine ourselves.
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